FROM HYDRO BELIZE TO HIGHER BILLS?
The Senate’s $256 Million Question
By: Omar Silva | Editor/Publisher
National Perspective Belize
Belize City: Tuesday, 21st October 2025
“Sell, regret, buy back, then sell again … the same cycle that has haunted this sector for 30 years.”
— Senator Patrick Faber, UDP
I. A Five-Hour Fight Over Belize’s Power
On Monday, October 20 th 2025, the Upper Chamber of the National Assembly turned into a battleground for Belize’s energy future.
For five hours, senators clashed over the Belize Electricity (Amendments) Bill 2025, which authorizes Government to borrow BZ $256 million to buy Fortis Inc.’s three hydroelectric plants on the Macal River and its 33 percent shareholding in BEL.
The vote passed — but the arguments exposed a fundamental divide between those who call the deal a patriotic investment and those who see it as another cycle of debt-fuelled speculation.
II. The Price Gap Widens
Just days earlier, Prime Minister Briceño had told Belizeans that the net cost of the Fortis acquisition was US $110 million (≈ BZ $220 million).
Now the Senate was told Government would borrow BZ $256 million domestically to finance the transaction.
No one explained the BZ $36 million jump.
Is it for closing fees, currency hedges, or political “flexibility”? None of the bill’s schedules were circulated to the public.
At current population levels, that loan equals ≈ BZ $6,500 per household in new sovereign debt — long before a single light bill falls by a cent.
III. Senator Faber’s Warning: “National Trophies on Borrowed Money”
Opposition Senator Patrick Faber cut through the celebratory tone:
“These are declining assets that will demand continuous reinvestment. After borrowing hundreds of millions to buy them, the government plans to sell them again quickly to so-called local investors. That is not nationalization — that is speculative trading in the name of patriotism.”
He reminded colleagues that the bill explicitly authorizes Government to divest the shares “as soon as practicable.”
That means the “sovereign energy” banner could be lowered the moment new buyers — banks, credit unions, or politically connected insiders — enter the market.
Faber drove home the contradiction:
“If we are buying it back, it must remain in public hands — not as a political trophy, but as national infrastructure.”
IV. The Government’s Counter-Narrative
PUP Senator Héctor Guerra framed the purchase as a patriotic triumph:
“The power from the Macal River will now electrify Belize’s prosperity. Fortis Belize generated 15 to 20 million dollars annually — profits that will now stay in our economy.”
He argued that the buyout eliminates a 1.5 percent annual price escalation clause in Fortis’s contracts, stabilizing rates for decades.
But the math is debatable. At the current PUC-approved average tariff of 43 cents BZ per kWh, a 1.5 percent reduction equals 0.6 of a cent — barely noticeable on a monthly bill. Meanwhile, the interest on BZ $256 million at 5 percent adds BZ $12.8 million per year to public debt service — more than the annual “savings” claimed from removing that escalator.
V. Profit, Pensions and Paradox
Faber’s other warning struck at the core of social equity:
“Holy Redeemer Credit Union and the Social Security Board are business entities geared toward profit. If they buy these shares, they will seek returns — not lower light bills.”
He is right. SSB’s Investment Policy requires a minimum real return above inflation. Every cent SSB lends or invests in Hydro Belize must earn profit from consumers — meaning ratepayers fund their own pension dividends through higher tariffs.
That is not public relief; it is circular financing masquerading as social ownership.
VI. The Faith and Finance View
Church Senator Luis Wade sought balance:
“Yes, we need to have national pride … but buy some shares in Fortis. When the government sells shares, buy some so we as Belizeans can make money off it, just like the foreigners were making money off it.”
His comment reveals the public confusion that has dogged Belize’s utility policy since the 1990s: nationalization is being sold as privatization by other means. Citizens are invited to “invest” in a debt they already guarantee as taxpayers.
VII. Courtenay’s Final Pitch
Leader of Government Business Eamon Courtenay defended the purchase as both patriotic and practical:
“It is at a significant discount that these assets are being acquired in the public interest. Every right-minded Belizean should support this deal.”
He added that Fortis Belize is already managed by 48 Belizeans, so no operational changes are needed.
Yet that fact undermines the very rationale for the loan: if Belizeans already manage and operate the plants, why incur BZ $256 million in debt to “nationalize” what is already functionally Belizean?
VIII. What the Numbers Say
Item Figure (BZ $ millions) Source / Implication
Loan authorization 256 Electricity (Amendments) Bill 2025
Est. purchase price (USD 110 M) 220 PM announcement Oct 17
Gap (unexplained) 36 Additional borrowing margin
BEL annual loss (2024) 8 BEL Annual Report 2024
Dam profits claimed by Gov’t 15 – 20 Sen. Hector Guerra speech
Annual loan interest @ 5 % 12.8 Budgetary impact
Est. tariff effect of 1.5 % clause removal –0.6 ¢/kWh Negligible consumer gain
Even if the dams earn BZ $20 million net annually, debt service would consume more than half that sum — leaving little room to lower rates or fund maintenance.
IX. Energy Arithmetic for Households
Every Belizean family average about 220 kWh per month. Under Scenario B (from Part 2), a 10 percent tariff rise adds ≈ BZ $15 to the monthly bill. Multiply that by 70,000 residential customers and the country pays an extra BZ $12.6 million per year — almost equal to the annual interest on the new loan.
In other words: for every cent Government saves in interest, households may pay a cent more on their bill.
X. The Pattern Repeats
The Senate debate proved what our previous investigations predicted: Belize’s energy policy remains stuck in a loop of political nationalism followed by financial privatization.
- 1990s: Fortis acquires control of BEL.
- 2011: BEL nationalized.
- 2015: Government pays Fortis BZ $70 million settlement.
- 2025: Government borrows BZ $256 million to buy Fortis again — with plans to sell “locally.”
Each turn of the wheel costs taxpayers more while household rates barely budge.
XI. A Call for Full Disclosure
Before any funds are drawn down, Government must release:
- The full independent valuation used to justify the price.
- The borrowing instrument — term, interest rate, currency, and repayment schedule.
- Projected tariff model showing impact on residential and commercial rates.
- Maintenance and rehabilitation plan for the three dams under Hydro Belize.
- Exit strategy for the planned “secondary domestic offering,” to ensure Belizean workers and not party financiers benefit.
Anything less would reduce the Senate’s five-hour debate to mere theatre.
XII. The People’s Verdict
When the lights flicker in a Belize City home, or a Corozal farmer pays his monthly bill, the question is no longer whether the dams are Belizean. It is whether the promise of sovereignty will lighten or darken the lives of those who foot the bill.
Until the Government proves that Hydro Belize can cut electricity costs for ordinary families without inflating public debt, this “national treasure” remains a national gamble.
SIDEBAR — THE $256 MILLION LOAN BREAKDOWN
(Based on Bill and Senate disclosures)
Component Est. BZ $ (mil.) Source / Note
Hydroelectric plants (Mollejon, Chalillo,Vaca ≈ 184 “Six × earnings” valuation
BEL 33 % shareholding ≈ 36 PM statement (US $18 M)
Fees, reserves, hedge costs ≈ 12 unexplained margins
Working capital & transaction costs ≈ 24 round-up to 256 M
Total Loan Authorization 256 M Electricity (Amendments) Bill 2025
“Power and the Price of Sovereignty: A National Perspective Investigation”
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